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Abstract
This paper considers two distinct procedures to lexicographically compose
multiple criteria for social or individual decision making. The ﬁrst procedure
composes M binary relations into one, and then selects its maximal elements.
The second procedure ﬁrst selects the set of maximal elements of the ﬁrst binary
relation, and then within that set, chooses the maximal elements of the second
binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the Mth binary relation. We
show several distinct sets of conditions for the choice functions representing
these two procedures to satisfy non-emptiness and choice-consistency condi-
tions such as contraction consistency (Chernoﬀ, 1954) and path independence
(Arrow, 1963). We also examine the relationships between the outcomes of the
two procedures. Then, we investigate under what conditions the outcomes of
each procedure are independent of the order of lexicographic application of the
criteria. Examples for applications of the results in the economic environments
are also presented.
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11 Introduction
In the process of social decision making, people often advocate multiple criteria on
which the desirability of alternatives should be judged. A typical example is the
equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. People say that economic growth is desirable because
the welfare of most individuals increases, while at the same time they insist that
an equitable distribution is essential for social stability. As often argued, however,
economic growth may give rise to an inequitable distribution of income and wealth.
Even a single individual’s decision may be based upon multiple criteria. As Sen
(1985) argues, an individual has not only material preferences over his own consump-
tions but also has value judgments based on, for instance, the sense of obligation,
which may contradict his material preferences. A family’s decision also typically in-
volves multiple criteria. Parents’ interest often conﬂicts with children’s interest on,
for example, video games.
When multiple criteria, each regarded as reasonable for itself, are in contradiction
with each other, one resolution would be to make a priority order for application
of the criteria. For such lexicographic applications of multiple criteria, however, we
can consider two distinct procedures of choice, which are described in the following.
Let us ﬁrst postulate that each criterion is expressed by a binary relation on the
set X of all alternatives. In the ﬁrst procedure, which we call procedure ®, we
ﬁrst compose lexicographically multiple binary relations R1;:::;RM into one binary
relation P(R1;:::;RM) in the following way: an alternative x is better than an
alternative y for P(R1;:::;RM) if and only if (i) x is superior to y for R1 or (ii)
y is not superior to x for R1 and x is superior to y for R2, or ¢¢¢ or (M) y is
not superior to x for R1;:::;RM¡1 and x is superior to y for RM. Then, for each
subset S of alternatives, we select the set CP(R1;;:::;RM)(S) of maximal elements for
P(R1;;:::;RM).
By contrast, in the second procedure, which we call procedure ¯, for each subset S
of alternatives, we ﬁrst choose the set CP(R1)(S) of maximal elements in S for the ﬁrst
criterion R1, and then select within the set CP(R1)(S), its subset CP(R2)[CP(R1)(S)]
of maximal elements for the second criterion R2, and iterate the procedure until the
Mth binary relation.
Indeed, the above two procedures provide diﬀerent choices for many cases. As a
simple example, consider S = fx;y;zg, R1 = f(x;z)g, and R2 = f(z;y)g. Then, since
(x;z);(z;y) 2 P(R1;R2), procedure ® chooses fxg from S. However, because the set
of maximal elements in S for R1 is fx;yg, and neither x nor y strictly dominates
2the other according to R2, procedure ¯ selects fx;yg from S. Procedure ® has
been introduced and examined by Tadenuma (2002, 2005), while procedure ¯ has
been introduced by Suzumura (1983b), Aizerman (1985) and Aizerman and Aleskerov
(1995), and studied more recently by Manzini and Mariotti (2005), Tadenuma (2005)
and Houy (2007).
When a decision-maker has multiple criteria, his behavior becomes much diﬀerent
from a simple maximizer of a single binary relation. It is more diﬃcult to have con-
sistent choices under multiple criteria than under a single criterion. In this paper, we
study under what conditions the choice correspondence derived from each procedure
to lexicographically compose multiple criteria satisfy non-emptiness and various prop-
erties of choice-consistency such as contraction consistency (Chernoﬀ, 1954) and path
independence (Arrow, 1963). We also examine relationships between the outcomes of
procedures ® and ¯.
Another interesting question would be whether the ﬁnal outcome depends on the
order of application of the multiple criteria. When we evaluate allocations, which
criterion should we apply ﬁrst, the eﬃciency criterion or the equity criterion? Such
a question is important if the order of application of the multiple criteria aﬀects the
ﬁnal outcome. But if the order is irrelevant, then we do not have to be concerned
about which criterion we should take ﬁrst. We investigate under what conditions the
outcomes of the choice correspondence of each procedure are independent of the order
of lexicographic application of the multiple criteria.
All the results in this paper are derived without speciﬁc restrictions on the set
of alternatives, but we present applications of the results in the classical division
problem of inﬁnitely divisible commodities.
There are many examples in which multiple criteria, each of which seems reason-
able for itself, contradict each other. In economics and social choice theory, the social
preference relation that has been most widely accepted is the Pareto domination.
However, the Pareto criterion is silent about the distributional equity of allocations
but concerns only eﬃcient use of resources. On the other hand, several interesting
concepts of distributional equity have been introduced and extensively studied in eco-
nomics. Two of them are central: no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence.1 It was Kolm
(1972) and Feldman and Kirman (1974) who pointed out that there is a fundamental
conﬂict between the Pareto criterion and the equity-as-no-envy criterion: there often
exist two allocations x and y such that x Pareto dominates y whereas x is not envy-
1The concept of no-envy was introduced by Foley (1967) and Kolm (1972), and that of egalitarian-
equivalence by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978).
3free but y is. The same kind of conﬂict also arises between the Pareto criterion and
the equity-as-egalitarian-equivalence criterion.
Social choice theory on abstract domains has also been extended to take account of
intersituational comparisons of individuals.2 In this “extended sympathy” approach,
Suzumura (1981a, b) studied choice-consistency of social choice functions satisfying
some conditions concerning Pareto eﬃciency and equity-as-no-envy in the framework
of abstract social choice. Tadenuma (2002, 2005) introduced various lexicographic
compositions of the Pareto criterion and the no-envy criterion, and of Pareto and
egalitarian-equivalence, respectively, in the classical division problem, and examined
rationality of the social preference relations. Tadenuma (2005) also showed that the
set of allocations selected by procedure ® with the Pareto criterion and the egalitarian-
equivalence criterion from the set of all feasible allocations is independent of the
order of lexicographic application of the two criteria, and that the essential reason
for this independence is because the set of allocation selected by procedure ¯ is also
independent of the order of application.
The present paper generalizes the results in these works by showing general con-
ditions for non-emptiness, contraction consistency, and path independence of choice
functions representing procedures ® and ¯, clarifying their relationships, and also
deriving conditions for independence of the order of application of multiple criteria.
The next section deﬁnes the basic notions and notation, and Section 3 introduces
the choice-consistency properties. In Sections 4 and 5, we investigate conditions for
non-emptiness and choice-consistency of procedure ® and procedure ¯, respectively.
Section 6 examines order-independence of each of the two procedures. The ﬁnal
section contains some concluding remarks.
2 Basic Deﬁnitions and Notation
Let X be a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) set of alternatives with jXj ¸ 3. Let X denote the
set of all ﬁnite subsets of X. A binary relation on X is a set R µ X £ X. The
set of all binary relations on X is denoted R. Given R 2 R, deﬁne P(R) 2 R by
(x;y) 2 P(R) , [(x;y) 2 R and (y;x) = 2 R], and I(R) 2 R by (x;y) 2 I(R) ,
[(x;y) 2 R and (y;x) 2 R]. Given R 2 R, a sequence (x1;:::;xK) µ X, K ¸ 2, is a
cycle for R if (x1;x2);(x2;x3);:::;(xK¡1;xK);(xK;x1) 2 R. A binary relation R 2 R
is
2Notable earlier contributions in this line of research are Harsanyi (1955), Suppes (1966), Pat-
tanaik (1968), Sen (1970), Hammond (1976) and Arrow (1977).
4² complete if for all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 R or (y;x) 2 R;
² transitive if for all x;y;z 2 X, (x;y) 2 R and (y;z) 2 R imply (x;z) 2 R;
² quasi-transitive if for all x;y;z 2 X, (x;y) 2 P(R) and (y;z) 2 P(R) imply
(x;z) 2 P(R);
² asymmetric if for all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 R implies (y;x) = 2 R;
² acyclic if there exists no cycle for R.
Note that acyclicity implies asymmetry by the above deﬁnitions.
In the rest of the paper, if (x1;:::;xK) µ X is a cycle, we abuse notation by
letting (K + 1) := 1 in order to simplify presentation of the results.
A choice function is a function C : X ! X such that C(S) µ S for all S 2 X.
Given R 2 R, we deﬁne the choice function CP(R) as the one selecting the set of
maximal elements for every S 2 X, that is,
8S 2 X; CP(R)(S) = fx 2 X j 8y 2 X; (y;x) = 2 P(R)g:
We say that a choice function C is rationalizable by a binary relation R 2 R if
C = CP(R).
In the following, we often consider the classical division problem with n agents and
m inﬁnitely divisible commodities deﬁned as follows. Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set
of agents. The consumption set of each agent is Rm
+. Let RE be the set of complete,
transitive and strictly monotonic3 relations on Rm
+. Each agent i 2 N is endowed
with a preference relation %i 2 RE. The associated strict preference relation and the
indiﬀerence relation are deﬁned as above, and denoted Âi and »i, respectively. An
allocation is a vector x = (x1;:::;xn) 2 Rmn
+ where each xi = (xi1;:::;xim) 2 Rm
+
is the consumption bundle of agent i 2 N. The set of alternatives in this division
problem is deﬁned as X = Rmn
+ .
3 Choice-Consistency Properties
In this section, we introduce some desirable properties of choice functions. A very
basic requirement is that at least one alternative should be chosen from any set.
Non-Emptiness: For all S 2 X, C(S) 6= ;.
3A preference relation % is strictly monotonic if for all a;b 2 Rm
+, a > b implies a Â b, where
a > b is deﬁned as a ¸ b and a 6= b.
5Our next three properties require “consistency” of choices in related situations.
The ﬁrst choice-consistency property means that if the set of available alternatives
“shrinks” but previously chosen alternatives are still available, then those alternatives
should remain chosen. This is a fundamental requirement of choice-consistency, and
it is satisﬁed by any choice function that is rationalizable by some binary relation.
Contraction Consistency (Chernoﬀ, 1954): For all S;T 2 X with T µ S, T \
C(S) µ C(T).
The second property requires “the independence of the ﬁnal choice from the path
to it” (Arrow, 1963, p.120). In real choice situations, we often divide the set of
alternatives into several parts in the ﬁrst round, and make ﬁnal choices from the
alternatives that have survived in the ﬁrst round. This property requires that the
ﬁnal choices should not depend on the way we divide the set of alternatives in the
ﬁrst round. It is an important property especially for social choice rules. Were it
violated, some arbitrary agenda controls could aﬀect the ﬁnal choice, which is clearly
undesirable.
Path Independence: For all S;T 2 X, C(C(S) [ C(T)) = C(S [ T).
It is well-known that Path Independence implies Contraction Consistency, but not
vice versa.
The third choice-consistency property says that if an alternative is chosen from
every pair containing it in the set S, then it should be chosen from S.
Condorcet Consistency: For all S 2 X and all x 2 S, if x 2 C(fx;yg) for all
y 2 S, then x 2 C(S).
The choice-consistency properties are related with rationalizability of the choice
functions. The following results are well-established.4
Proposition 1 (Blair et al., 1976) A choice function C satisﬁes Non-Emptiness,
Contraction Consistency and Condorcet Consistency if and only if it is rationalizable
by a binary relation R such that P(R) is acyclic.
Given a binary relation R 2 R, CP(R) satisﬁes Condorcet Consistency by deﬁni-
tion. As we have noted, any choice function that is rationalizable by a binary relation
satisﬁes Contraction Consistency. Hence, we have the following corollary.
4A good reference for these results is Suzumura (1983a, Ch.2).
6Corollary 1 Let R 2 R be given. The choice function CP(R) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness
if and only if P(R) is acyclic.
Similar relations hold for Path Independence and rationalizability by a quasi-
transitive binary relation.
Proposition 2 (Plott, 1973) A choice function C satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, Path In-
dependence and Condorcet Consistency if and only if it is rationalizable by a quasi-
transitive binary relation.
Corollary 2 Let R 2 R be given. The choice function CP(R) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness
and Path Independence if and only if R is quasi-transitive.
4 Lexicographic Composition of Multiple Binary
Relations
As we have mentioned in the introduction, we consider two distinct procedures to
compose multiple criteria for decision making. This section focuses on procedure ® in
which we ﬁrst compose M binary relations R1;:::;RM into one, and then choose its




M) = f(x;y) 2 X £ X j [(x;y) 2 P(R
1)] or
[(y;x) 62 P(R
1) and (x;y) 2 P(R
2)] or ¢¢¢
[(y;x) 62 P(R
1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(R
M) and (x;y) 2 P(R
M)]g:
We call P(R1;:::;RM) the lexicographic composition of R1;:::;RM. Notice that
P(R1;:::;RM) is asymmetric and hence P(P(R1;:::;RM)) = P(R1;:::;RM).
We examine under what conditions the choice function CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness and Path Independence. By Corollaries 1 and 2, our examination reduces
to checking acyclicity and quasi-transitivity of P(R1;:::;RM). We also present ex-
amples for applications of the results in economic environments.
Our ﬁrst result gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition for P(R1;:::;RM) to be
acyclic, and equivalently, for CP(R1;:::;RM) to be non-empty.
Proposition 3 Let R1;:::;RM 2 R. The lexicographic composition P(R1;:::;RM)
is acyclic if and only if for every cycle (x1;:::;xK) µ X for P(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM), there
exists k 2 f1;:::;Kg such that for every m 2 f1;:::;Mg with (xk;xk+1) 2 P(Rm),
there exists m0 2 f1;:::;Mg, m0 < m, such that (xk+1;xk) 2 P(Rm0).
7Proof. Necessity. Assume that there exists a cycle (x1;:::;xK) µ X for P(R1) [
¢¢¢ [ P(RM) such that for every k 2 f1;:::;Kg, there exists m 2 f1;:::;Mg such
that (xk;xk+1) 2 P(Rm) and (xk+1;xk) = 2 P(Rm0) for all m0 < m. Then, by deﬁnition,
(xk;xk+1) 2 P(R1;¢¢¢ ;RM) for every k 2 f1;:::;Kg, and (x1;:::;xK) µ X is a cycle
for P(R1;¢¢¢ ;RM).
Suﬃciency. Assume that for every cycle (x1;:::;xK) µ X for P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [
P(RM), there exists k 2 f1;:::;Kg such that for every m 2 f1;:::;Mg with
(xk;xk+1) 2 P(Rm), there exists m0 2 f1;:::;Mg, m0 < m such that (xk+1;xk) 2
P(Rm0). Suppose, on the contrary, that P(R1;:::;RM) has a cycle (y1;:::;yL) µ X.
Then, (y1;:::;yL) is also a cycle for P(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM). By the assumption, there
exists ` 2 f1;:::;Lg such that for every m 2 f1;:::;Mg with (y`;y`+1) 2 P(Rm),
there exists m0 2 f1;:::;Mg, m0 < m such that (y`+1;y`) 2 P(Rm0). Then, by deﬁ-
nition, (y`;y`+1) = 2 P(R1;:::;RM), contradicting the fact that (y1;:::;yL) µ X is a
cycle for P(R1;:::;RM).
In many economic problems, a trade-oﬀ arises between two criteria such as eﬃ-
ciency vs. equity, growth vs. environmental quality, eﬃciency vs. liberty, and so on.
In such cases, we can obtain simpler conditions for acyclicity or quasi-transitivity of
the lexicographic compositions of two binary relations. Next, we provide several suf-
ﬁcient conditions for P(R1;R2) to be acyclic or quasi-transitive, which may be useful
in various contexts.
Proposition 4 Let R1;R2 2 R. If R1 is complete and transitive, and R2 is quasi-
transitive, then P(R1;R2) is quasi-transitive.
Proof. Let x;y;z 2 X. Assume that (x;y) 2 P(R1;R2) and (y;z) 2 P(R1;R2).
From (x;y) 2 P(R1;R2), we have (1) (x;y) 2 P(R1) or (2) (x;y) = 2 P(R1), (y;x) = 2
P(R1) and (x;y) 2 P(R2). By completeness of R1, (x;y) = 2 P(R1) and (y;x) = 2 P(R1)
if and only if (x;y) 2 I(R1). Similarly, it follows from (y;z) 2 P(R1;R2) that (3)
(y;z) 2 P(R1) or (4) (y;z) 2 I(R1) and (y;z) 2 P(R2). If (1) and [(3) or (4)] hold
true, then by transitivity of R1, we have (x;z) 2 P(R1), and hence (x;z) 2 P(R1;R2).
Similarly, (2) and (3) together imply (x;z) 2 P(R1) and (x;z) 2 P(R1;R2). Finally,
if (2) and (4) hold, then (x;z) 2 I(R1) follows from transitivity of R1, and (x;z) 2
P(R2) from quasi-transitivity of R2. Hence, we have (x;z) 2 P(R1;R2).
There are many examples in allocation problems to which the above result can be
applied.
8Example 1 Envy-free allocations. An allocation x 2 Rmn
+ is envy-free if for all
i;j 2 N, (xi;xj) 2%i. Let F ½ Rmn
+ be the set of envy-free allocations. Deﬁne
RF 2 R as follows: for all x;y 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 RF if and only if x 2 F or y = 2 F.
Deﬁne RP 2 R as follows: for all x;y 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 RP if and only if for all
i 2 N, (xi;yi) 2%i. The social preference relation RP is called the weak Pareto
domination, and the associated strict social preference relation P(RP) the Pareto
domination. Since RF is complete and transitive, and RP is quasi-transitive, it follows
from Proposition 4 that P(RF;RP) is quasi-transitive. Hence, the choice function
CP(RF;RP) is not empty and satisﬁes the Path Independence condition.
Example 2 Ranking by the number of envy instances. For each x 2 Rmn
+ ,
deﬁne the set H(x) ½ N £ N by
H(x) = f(i;j) 2 N £ N j (xj;xi) 2Âig:
The set H(x) is the set of all instances of envy at x. Following Feldman and Kirman
(1974), deﬁne RH 2 R as follows: for all x;y 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 RH if and only if
#H(x) · #H(y). Then, RH is complete and transitive. By Proposition 4, P(RH;RP)
is quasi-transitive (Tadenuma, 2002).
Example 3 Egalitarian-equivalent allocations. An allocation x 2 Rmn
+ is
egalitarian-equivalent if there exists a 2 Rm
+ such that for all i 2 N, (xi;a) 2»i.
Let E ½ Rmn
+ be the set of egalitarian-equivalent allocations. Deﬁne RE 2 R as
follows: for all x;y 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 RE if and only if x 2 E or y = 2 E. Then, RE is
complete and transitive. By Proposition 4, P(RE;RP) is quasi-transitive (Tadenuma,
2005).
A similar result can be obtained for acyclicity of P(R1;R2).
Proposition 5 Let R1;R2 2 R. If R1 is complete and transitive, and P(R2) is
acyclic, then P(R1;R2) is acyclic.
Proof. Assume that R1 is complete and transitive, and P(R2) is acyclic. Suppose,
on the contrary, that there exists a cycle (x1;:::;xK) 2 X for P(R1;R2). Because
R1 is complete, for all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 P(R1;R2) implies that (x;y) 2 R1. Hence,
we have (xk;xk+1) 2 R1 for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Therefore, by transitivity of R1, for
all k;k0 2 f1;:::;Kg, (xk;xk0) 2 I(R1). Then, since (x1;:::;xK) 2 X is a cycle for
P(R1;R2), we must have (xk;xk+1) 2 P(R2) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg. This contradicts
the acyclicity of P(R2).
9If R1 2 R is only quasi-transitive, then even if R1 is complete and R2 2 R is
complete and transitive, P(R1;R2) may have a cycle.
Example 4 Deﬁne R
ˆ P 2 R as follows: for all x;y 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 R
ˆ P if and
only if (y;x) = 2 P(RP). Sen (1970) called R
ˆ P the Pareto extension. Notice that
P(R
ˆ P) = P(RP), and R
ˆ P is complete and quasi-transitive. As we noted, RF, RH,




ˆ P;RE) is acyclic (Tadenuma, 2002, 2005). Notice that, since P(R
ˆ P) = P(RP),
none of P(RP;RF), P(RP;RH) and P(RP;RE) is acyclic either.
The Pareto principle plays a central role in economics, but it says nothing about
distributional equity. On the other hand, many binary relations based on some con-
cepts of equity are complete and transitive. Suppose that we would like to socially
rank allocations ﬁrstly by the Pareto principle, and secondly by an equity principle.
When does such lexicographic applications of the Pareto and an equity principles
generate an acyclic social preference relation? To answer the question, it is of special
interest to investigate under what conditions P(R1;R2) shows no cycle when R1 2 R
is only quasi-transitive and R2 2 R is complete and transitive. Our next result gives
an answer to this question.
To present the result, we deﬁne the following binary relation: for all x;y 2 X,
(x;y) 2 Γ , [(x;y) = 2 P(R
1);(y;x) = 2 P(R
1) and (x;y) 2 P(R
2)]:
That is, (x;y) 2 Γ if and only if x and y are non-comparable or indiﬀerent by
the ﬁrst criterion, and x is superior to y by the second criterion. Note that P(R1)
and Γ decompose P(R1;R2), that is, P(R1;R2) = P(R1) [ Γ and P(R1) \ Γ = ;.
The relationships among any three alternatives in terms of these two components of
P(R1;R2) are the key to acyclicity of P(R1;R2).
Proposition 6 Let R1;R2 2 R. Suppose that R1 is quasi-transitive, and that R2 is
complete and transitive. Suppose further that the following two conditions hold:
(A) for all x;y;z 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Γ, (y;z) 2 P(R1) and (z;y) 2 P(R2), then
(x;z) 2 P(R1).
(B) for all x;y;z 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Γ and (y;z) 2 Γ, then (z;x) = 2 P(R1).
Then, the lexicographic composition P(R1;R2) is acyclic.
Proof. Assume that R1 is quasi-transitive, that R2 is complete and transitive,
and that conditions (A) and (B) are satisﬁed. Suppose, on the contrary, that that
10P(R1;R2) has a cycle. Let (x1;:::;xk) be a cycle of the smallest cardinality for
P(R1;R2). Since P(R1;R2) is asymmetric, k ¸ 3.
Assume that (x1;x2);(x2;x3) 2 P(R1). Then, by quasi-transitivity of R1,
(x1;x3) 2 P(R1) and then (x1;x3;:::;xk) is a cycle for P(R1;R2) which contradicts
the fact that (x1;:::;xk) is a cycle of the smallest cardinality for P(R1;R2).
Assume that (x1;x2);(x2;x3) 2 Γ. Then, by deﬁnition, (x1;x2);(x2;x3) 2 P(R2),
and by transitivity of R2, (x1;x3) 2 P(R2). Moreover, by condition (B), (x3;x1) = 2
P(R1) which implies that (x1;x3) 2 P(R1;R2). Then (x1;x3;:::;xk) is a cycle for
P(R1;R2) which contradicts the fact that (x1;:::;xk) is a cycle of the smallest cardi-
nality for P(R1;R2).
Let (x1;:::;xk) be one of the smallest cycles for P(R1;R2) with k ¸ 3. From
what we have shown above, with no loss of generality, we can set (x1;x2) 2 Γ and
(x2;x3) 2 P(R1). We distinguish two cases.
(1) If (x3;x2) 2 P(R2), then by condition (A), (x1;x3) 2 P(R1). Hence, (x1;x3;:::;xk)
is a cycle for P(R1;R2), which contradicts the fact that (x1;:::;xk) is a cycle of the
smallest cardinality for P(R1;R2).
(2) If (x3;x2) = 2 P(R2), then by completeness of R2, (x2;x3) 2 R2. Together with
(x1;x2) 2 Γ and transitivity of R2, we have (x1;x3) 2 P(R2). If (x3;x1) 2 P(R1),
then by quasi-transitivity of R1, (x2;x1) 2 P(R1), which contradicts (x1;x2) 2 Γ.
Hence, (x3;x1) = 2 P(R1). But then, (x1;x3) 2 P(R1;R2), and (x1;x3;:::;xk) is a cycle
for P(R1;R2), which contradicts the fact that (x1;:::;xk) is a cycle of the smallest
cardinality for P(R1;R2).
The usefulness of the above result may be illustrated by the following example.
Example 5 For each i 2 N, let ai 2 Rm
+ be the reference bundle for agent i. (Exam-
ples of reference bundles are (i) the equal division bundle for all agents under a social
resource constraint, (ii) initial endowment bundles in a private ownership economy,
(iii) minimum bundles to meet some basic functionings.) Deﬁne RB 2 R as follows:
for all x;y 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 RB if and only if #fi 2 N j (xi;ai) 2%ig ¸ #fi 2 N j
(yi;ai) 2%ig. Clearly, RB is complete and transitive. Notice that if (x;y) 2 P(RP)
where RP is the weak Pareto domination deﬁned above, then it never occurs that
(y;x) 2 P(RB). Hence, condition (A) in Proposition 6 is vacuously satisﬁed. Fur-
thermore, if (x;y) 2 Γ and (y;z) 2 Γ, then (x;z) 2 P(RB) by transitivity of RB,
and hence (z;x) = 2 P(RP). Therefore, condition (B) in Proposition 6 is also met. We
can conclude that the the lexicographic composition P(RP;RB) is acyclic. The same
result holds for P(R
ˆ P;RB).
11Often an equity criterion dichotomizes allocations into equitable and non-equitable
ones. In such a case, we can deﬁne a complete and transitive binary relation R2 as
follows: for all x;y 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 R2 if and only if x is equitable or y is not equitable.
Note that from this deﬁnition, (x;y) 2 P(R2) if and only if x is equitable and y is not
equitable. Moreover, in this case, R2 has at most two indiﬀerence classes. Hence, the
condition (B) in Proposition 6 is irrelevant because for all x;y;z 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 Γ
and (y;z) 2 Γ cannot occur together. Therefore, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Let R1;R2 2 R. Suppose that R1 is quasi-transitive, and that R2 is
complete and transitive, and has at most two indiﬀerence classes. Suppose further
that for all x;y;z 2 X, if (x;y) 2 Γ, (y;z) 2 P(R1) and (z;y) 2 P(R2), then
(x;z) 2 P(R1). Then, the lexicographic composition P(R1;R2) is acyclic.
As an example of application of the above corollary, we present the lexicographic
composition of the Pareto domination and the binary relation based on egalitarian-
equivalence that was studied in Tadenuma (2005).
Let A ½ Rmn
+ be such that for all a;b 2 A, a ¸ b or b ¸ a. An allocation
x 2 Rmn
+ is A-egalitarian-equivalent if there exists a 2 A such that (xi;a) 2 »i for all
i 2 N. Let EA ½ Rmn
+ be the set of A-egalitarian-equivalent allocations. Deﬁne REA
as follows: for all x;y 2 Rmn
+ , (x;y) 2 REA if and only if x 2 EA or y = 2 EA. Notice
that (x;y) 2 P(REA) if and only if x 2 EA and y = 2 EA. One can check that REA is
complete and transitive.
Corollary 4 Let REA be deﬁned as above. Let RP be the weak Pareto domination.
Then, the lexicographic composition P(RP;REA) is acyclic.
Proof. As noted above, REA is complete and transitive, and RP is quasi-transitive.
In view of Corollary 3, it is enough to show that for all x;y;z 2 Rmn
+ , if (x;y) 2 Γ,
(y;z) 2 P(RP) and (z;y) 2 P(REA), then (x;z) 2 P(RP).
Suppose that (x;y) 2 Γ, (y;z) 2 P(RP) and (z;y) 2 P(REA). Because (x;y) 2
P(REA), we have x 2 EA and y = 2 EA. Thus, there exists a 2 A such that (xi;a) 2»i
for all i 2 N. Since (z;y) 2 P(REA), we have z 2 EA and y = 2 EA. Hence, there
exists b 2 A such that (zi;b) 2 »i for all i 2 N. If (yi;xi) 2 »i for all i 2 N, then
(yi;a) 2 »i for all i 2 N, which contradicts y = 2 EA. Therefore, (y;x) = 2 P(RP) holds
only if there exists i¤ 2 N such that (xi¤;yi¤) 2 Âi¤. Since (y;z) 2 P(RP), we have
(yi;zi) 2 %i for all i 2 N, and in particular, for agent i¤. Hence, (xi¤;zi¤) 2 Âi¤. We
also have (a;xi¤) 2 »i¤ and (zi¤;b) 2 »i¤. By transitivity of %i¤, (a;b) 2 Âi¤. Since
12a;b 2 A, either a > b or b > a. By strict monotonicity of %i¤, we have a > b. Then,
for all i 2 N, (xi;a) 2»i, (a;b) 2 Âi and (b;zi) 2 »i. It follows from transitivity of
%i that (xi;zi) 2 Âi. Thus, we have (x;z) 2 P(RP).
5 Lexicographic Composition of Multiple Choice
Functions
In this section, we study the procedure ¯ to compose multiple criteria, namely, we
ﬁrst choose the set of maximal elements for the ﬁrst binary relation R1, and then from
this set we select its subset of maximal elements for the second binary relation R2, and
iterate this procedure until the last binary relation RM. Formally, the procedure is






m¡1(S)) for each m = 1;:::;M
and CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S) = CM(S):
In contrast to procedure ®, procedure ¯ provides non-empty outcomes under very
mild conditions. Indeed, if each of the original criteria, P(R1);:::;P(RM), does not
have a cycle, then CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S) 6= ; for every S 2 X. However, even if there
exists a cycle S for P(R2), CP(R2)CP(R1)(S) 6= ; holds as long as P(R1) is acyclic
and P(R1) ranks at least one pair in S, and eliminate at least one alternative from
CP(R1)(S). A similar observation holds for every Rm, m = 3;:::;M. The following
result, which was shown in Houy (2007), provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) to satisfy non-emptiness.
Proposition 7 Let R1;:::;RM 2 R be given. The choice function CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)
satisﬁes Non-Emptiness if and only if for every m 2 f1;:::;Mg, and for every cycle
(x1;:::;xK) µ X for P(Rm), there exist m0 < m and k;` 2 f1;:::;Kg such that
(xk;x`) 2 P(Rm0).
Proof. See Houy (2007, Theorem 2).
Comparing Propositions 3 and 7, we can see that if CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes non-
emptiness (or equivalently, P(R1;:::;RM) is acyclic), then CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes
non-emptiness as well. In other words, when we compose lexicographically two cri-
teria for decision making, it is more diﬃcult to guarantee non-empty choices under
procedure ® than under procedure ¯.
13Corollary 5 Let R1;:::;RM 2 R be given. If the choice function CP(R1;:::;RM) satis-
ﬁes non-emptiness, then CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) also satisﬁes non-emptiness.
The following example shows that the converse of Corollary 5 does not hold true.
Example 6 Let RP be the weak Pareto domination, and let RF be deﬁned as in
Example 1. As noted above, RP is quasi-transitive and RF is transitive. Hence,
for every ﬁnite set S 2 Rm
+, CP(RP)(S) 6= ;, and CP(RF)(CP(RP)(S)) 6= ;. However,
there exists a cycle for P(RP;RF) (Tadenuma, 2002), and hence CP(RP;RF) does not
satisfy non-emptiness. The same result holds for the other criteria given in Example
4, namely CP(RH)CP(RP) and CP(RE)CP(RP) satisfy non-emptiness whereas CP(RH;RP)
and CP(RE;RP) do not.
We now examine the choice consistency properties of the lexicographic compo-
sition of multiple choice functions. First, we show a basic relationship between the
choice functions derived from procedures ® and ¯. It also implies Corollary 5 above.
Lemma 1 For every S 2 X, CP(R1)(S) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM)(S) µ CP(R1;:::;RM)(S) µ
CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S).
Proof. To show that CP(R1)(S)\¢¢¢\CP(RM)(S) µ CP(R1;:::;RM)(S), let S 2 X, x 2 S
and x = 2 CP(R1;:::;RM)(S). Then, there exists y 2 S with (y;x) 2 P(R1;:::;RM). By
deﬁnition, (y;x) 2 P(Rm) for some m 2 f1;:::Mg. Hence, x = 2 CP(Rm)(S), and
x = 2 CP(R1)(S) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM)(S).
To prove that CP(R1;:::;RM)(S) µ CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S), let S 2 X, x 2 S and x = 2
CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S). Then, either (i) x = 2 CP(R1)(S) or (ii) there exist m 2 f1;:::;M¡
1g and y 2 S such that x;y 2 CP(Rm) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S) and (y;x) 2 P(Rm+1). In case
(i), there exists z 2 X such that (z;x) 2 P(R1), and hence (z;x) 2 P(R1;:::;RM).
Therefore, x = 2 CP(R1;:::;RM)(S). In case (ii), it follows that (x;y) = 2 P(R1)[¢¢¢[P(Rm)
and (y;x) 2 P(Rn+1). By deﬁnition, (y;x) 2 P(R1;:::;RM), which implies x = 2
CP(R1;:::;RM)(S).
Our next proposition shows a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) to satisfy Contraction Consistency. It is interesting to see that
the condition requires a certain relationship among any three alternatives in terms of
the decompositions of P(R1;:::;RM) deﬁned below.
Let R1;:::;RM be given. Deﬁne Γ1;:::;ΓM 2 R as follows: Γ1 = P(R1), and for
each m 2 f2;:::;Mg, and for all x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 Γm if and only if (x;y);(y;x) = 2
P(Rm0) for all m0 < m and (x;y) 2 P(Rm). Note that P(R1;:::;RM) = Γ1 [ Γ2 [
¢¢¢ [ ΓM and for all m;m0 2 f1;:::;Mg with m 6= m0, Γm \ Γm0 = ;.
14Proposition 8 Assume that CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness. Then,
CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Contraction Consistency if and only if for all x;y;z 2 X,
and for all m;m0 2 f1;:::;Mg with m < m0, [(x;y) 2 Γm and (y;z) 2 Γm0] im-
plies (x;z) 2 Γm00 for some m00 2 f1;:::;Mg. Moreover, if CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes
Non-Emptiness and Contraction Consistency, then CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R1;:::;RM).
Proof. Suﬃciency. Assume that CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, and
that for all x;y;z 2 X, and for all m;m0 2 f1;:::;Mg with m < m0, [(x;y) 2 Γm
and (y;z) 2 Γm0] implies (x;z) 2 Γm00 for some m00 2 f1;:::;Mg.
First, we show that P(R1;:::;RM) is acyclic. Suppose, on the contrary, that
P(R1;:::;RM) has a cycle. Let Y = (x1;:::;xK) µ X be one of the cycles with the
smallest cardinality. Since P(R1;:::;RM) is asymmetric, K ¸ 3. By Proposition
7 and since CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, it follows that for no m 2
f1;:::;Mg, Y is a cycle for Γm. Hence, there exist m;m0 2 f1;:::;Mg with m < m0
and k 2 f1;:::;Kg such that (xk;xk+1) 2 Γm and (xk+1;xk+2) 2 Γm0, where we
abuse notation by letting (K + 1) := 1 and (K + 2) := 2. By the assumption, we
have (xk;xk+2) 2 Γm00 for some m00 2 f1;:::;Mg. Then, (x1;:::;xk;xk+2;:::;xK) is
a cycle for P(R1;:::;RM), which contradicts the fact that Y is one of the cycles with
the smallest cardinality. Thus, P(R1;:::;RM) is acyclic.
Now we show that CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Contraction Consistency. Suppose,
on the contrary, that CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) violates Contraction Consistency. Then, there
exist S;T 2 X with S µ T and x 2 S such that x 2 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(T) but
x = 2 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S).
Since x 2 CP(R1)(T) and S µ T, we have x 2 CP(R1)(S). However, because x = 2
CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S), there exist n1 2 f2;:::;Mg and y1 2 CP(Rn1¡1) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S)
such that (y1;x) 2 Γn1. Then, since x 2 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(T), it must be true that
y1 = 2 CP(Rn1¡1) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(T).
Then there exist m1 < n1 and y2 2 CP(Rm1¡1) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(T) with (y2;y1) 2 Γm1.
By the assumption, we have (y2;x) 2 Γn2 for some n2 2 f2;:::;Mg. (Note that
(y2;x) = 2 Γ1 = P(R1) since x 2 CP(R1)(T).)
Because x 2 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(T), it must be true that y2 = 2
CP(Rn2¡1) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(T). Then, a similar argument shows that there exist y3 2 T and
m2 2 f1;:::;Mg such that (y3;y2) 2 Γm2 and (y3;x) 2 Γn3 for some n3 2 f2;:::;Mg.
Repeating the above argument, we obtain a sequence (y1;y2;y3;:::) 2 T£T::: such
that for every k, (yk+1;yk) 2 Γmk ½ P(R1;:::;RM). Since T is ﬁnite, there exists `
such that y` = yk for some k < `. This contradicts the acyclicity of P(R1;:::;RM).
15Necessity. Suppose that there exist x;y;z 2 X and m;m0 2 f1;:::;Mg
with m < m0 such that (x;y) 2 Γm, (y;z) 2 Γm0, and for all m00 2 f1;:::;Mg,
(x;z) = 2 Γm00. Let T = fx;y;zg and S = fy;zg. Then, z 2 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(T)
but z = 2 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S). Thus, CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) does not satisfy Contraction
Consistency.
Now let us prove that if CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness and Contraction
Consistency, then, CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R1;:::;RM). By Lemma 1, CP(R1;:::;RM)(S) µ
CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S) for every S 2 X. To show the converse inclusion relation,
let x 2 S and x = 2 CP(R1;:::;RM)(S). Then, there exists y 2 S such that (y;x) 2
P(R1;:::;RM). Hence, for some m 2 f1;:::;Mg, (y;x) 2 Γm. This implies that
x = 2 CP(Rm) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(fx;yg) and thus x = 2 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(fx;yg). It follows from
Contraction Consistency of CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) that x = 2 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S).
The following example shows that even if CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness and
Contraction Consistency, or equivalently, P(R1;:::;RM) is acyclic, then it is possi-
ble that CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) 6= CP(R1;:::;RM) and CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) violates Contraction
Consistency.
Example 7 Let S = fx;y;zg. Assume that P(R1) = f(z;y)g and P(R2) = f(y;x)g.
Then, P(R1;R2) is acyclic and CP(R1;R2) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness and Contraction
Consistency. However, CP(R2)CP(R1)(S) = CP(R2)(fx;zg) = fx;zg and CP(R1;R2)(S) =
fzg. Hence, CP(R2)CP(R1) 6= CP(R1;R2). Let T = fx;yg ½ S. Then, although x 2
T \ CP(R2)CP(R1)(S), CP(R2)CP(R1)(T) = fyg. This is a violation of Contraction
Consistency.
Corollary 6 Let R1;:::;RM 2 R be given. If CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness and Contraction Consistency, then CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness
and Contraction Consistency, or equivalently, P(R1;:::;RM) is acyclic. However,
the converse does not hold true.
In contrast to the results on Contraction Consistency, requiring Non-Emptiness
and Path Independence for CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) is equivalent to requiring the same con-
ditions for CP(R1;:::;RM) as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 9 The following three statements are equivalent.
1. P(R1;:::;RM) is quasi-transitive.
2. CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness and Path Independence.
163. CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness and Path Independence.
Proof.
1 , 2:
This has already been shown in Corollary 2.
1 ) 3:
Assume that P(R1;:::;RM) is quasi transitive. Then, it is acyclic, and by Corollary 1,
CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness. It follows from Lemma 1 that CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)
satisﬁes Non-Emptiness as well. Notice that if P(R1;:::;RM) is quasi transitive, then
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for Contraction Consistency of CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)
in Proposition 8 is met. Hence, by Proposition 8, CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R1;:::;RM). It
follows from the equivalence of 1 with 2 that CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Path Independence.
Thus, CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Path Independence.
3 ) 2:
Assume that CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness and Path Independence. Since
Path Independence implies Contraction Consistency, it follows from Proposition 8
that CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R1;:::;RM). Hence, CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness
and Path Independence.
To illustrate this result, let us go back to Examples 1, 2 and 3. We have shown
that CP(RF;RP), CP(RH;RP), and CP(RE;RP) satisfy Non-Emptiness and Path Indepen-
dent. Then, by Proposition 9, we can conclude that CP(RP)CP(RF), CP(RP)CP(RH),
and CP(RP)CP(RE) also satisfy Non-Emptiness and Path Independent.
6 Order Independence of Lexicographic Composi-
tions
This section investigates under what conditions the outcomes of each choice procedure
are independent of the order of lexicographic applications of multiple criteria.
The next result, which is based on Lemma 1, shows that if procedure ® satisﬁes
order independence, then it always chooses the set of alternatives that are maximal
for every criterion.
Deﬁne the choice function CP(R1) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM) : X ! X as [CP(R1) \ ¢¢¢ \
CP(RM)](S) = CP(R1)(S) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM)(S) for every S 2 X.
Proposition 10 If CP(R1;:::;RM) = CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)) for every permutation ¼ on
f1;:::;Mg, then CP(R1;:::;RM) = CP(R1) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM).
17Proof. Assume that CP(R1;:::;RM)(S) = CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M))(S) for every permutation ¼
on f1;:::;Mg. Let S 2 X. By Lemma 1, it is enough to show that CP(R1;:::;RM)(S) µ
CP(R1)(S) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM)(S). Let x 2 S and x = 2 CP(R1)(S) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM)(S).
Then, there exists i 2 f1;:::;Mg and y 2 S such that (y;x) 2 P(Ri). Consider a
permutation ¼ on f1;:::;Mg such that ¼(1) = i. Then, (y;x) 2 P(R¼(1)). Hence,
by the deﬁnition of P(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)), (y;x) 2 P(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)). Thus, x = 2
CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M))(S) = CP(R1;:::;RM)(S).
As in the case of the eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ, if x is superior to y according to
one criterion where as y is better than x by another criterion, then the best choice
from fx;yg must depend on which criterion we should take ﬁrst. Hence, in order for
the ﬁnal choice to be independent of the order of application of the two criteria, such
conﬂict cannot arise. The following result formalizes this observation.
Proposition 11 CP(R1;:::;RM) = CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)) for every permutation ¼ on
f1;:::;Mg if and only if P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is asymmetric. Moreover, if
CP(R1;:::;RM) = CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)) for every permutation ¼ on f1;:::;Mg, then
CP(R1;:::;RM) = CP(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM) = CP(R1) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM).
Proof. Necessity. Suppose that P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is symmetric. Since each of
the M binary relations, P(R1);:::;P(RM), is asymmetric by deﬁnition, there exist
x;y 2 X such that x 6= y, (x;y) 2 P(Ri) and (y;x) 2 P(Rj) for some i;j 2 f1;:::Mg
with i 6= j. Let ¼ and ¾ be two permutations on f1;:::;Mg such that ¼(1) = i and
¾(1) = j. Then, by the deﬁnition of P(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)), (x;y) 2 P(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M))
whereas by the deﬁnition of P(R¾(1);:::;R¾(M)), (y;x) 2 P(R¾(1);:::;R¾(M)). Hence,
CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M))(fx;yg) = fxg 6= fyg = CP(R¾(1);:::;R¾(M))(fx;yg).
Suﬃciency. Assume that P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is asymmetric. It is clear that
generally P(R1;:::;RM) µ P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM). Let x;y 2 X and (x;y) 2
P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM). Then, (x;y) 2 P(Ri) for some i 2 f1;:::;Mg. By the
assumption, (y;x) = 2 P(Rj) for all j 2 f1;:::;Mg. Thus, from the deﬁnition
of P(R1;:::;RM), we have (x;y) 2 P(R1;:::;RM). Then, we have shown that
P(R1;:::;RM) = P(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM). By the same argument, it can be shown that
for every permutation ¼ on f1;:::;Mg, CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M))(S) = CP(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM)(S).
Thus, CP(R1;:::;RM)(S) = CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M))(S) = CP(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM)(S). Together with
Proposition 10, this completes the proof.
If we also require non-emptiness as well as order independence, a further stronger
condition must be called for.
18Corollary 7 CP(R1;:::;RM) = CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)) for every permutation ¼ on f1;:::;Mg
and CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Non Emptiness if and only if P(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM) is acyclic.
Proof. Necessity. Assume that CP(R1;:::;RM) = CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)) for every permu-
tation ¼ on f1;:::;Mg and CP(R1;:::;RM) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness. By Proposition
11, P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is asymmetric and CP(R1;:::;RM) = CP(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM). Then,
CP(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness. By Corollary 1, P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is
acyclic.
Suﬃciency. Assume that P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is acyclic. Then, P(R1) [
¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is asymmetric by deﬁnition, and it follows from Proposition 11 that
CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)) = CP(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM) = CP(R1)(S) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM) for every permutation
¼ on f1;:::;Mg. Moreover, by Corollary 1, CP(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness.
Notice that acyclicity of P(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM) is suﬃcient but not necessary for non-
emptiness of CP(R1;:::;RM). It is necessary for CP(R1;:::;RM) to satisfy order independence
as well as non-emptiness.
Asymmetry of P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is very demanding in economic allocation
problems. It implies that any two criteria are never in contradiction. This requirement
is rarely met when we are concerned with the eﬃciency and equity criteria.
The acyclicity of P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is also necessary for procedure ¯ to be
order independent. In fact, requiring order independence of procedure ¯ is even more
demanding than procedure ®.
Proposition 12 If CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R¼(M)) ¢¢¢CP(R¼(1)) for every permutation
¼ on f1;:::;Mg, then CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R1)(S) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM).
Proof. By Lemma 1, CP(R1) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM) µ CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1). Let S 2 X. Let
x 2 S and x = 2 CP(R1)(S) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM)(S). Then, there exists i 2 f1;:::;Mg and
y 2 S such that (y;x) 2 P(Ri). Consider a permutation ¼ on f1;:::;Mg such that
¼(1) = i. By assumption, (y;x) 2 P(R¼(1)), and hence x = 2 CP(R¼(1))(S). Then,
x = 2 CP(R¼(M)) ¢¢¢CP(R¼(1))(S) = CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1)(S). Therefore, CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) µ
CP(R1) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM).
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for procedure ¯ to satisfy order independence
as well as Non-Emptiness was given in Houy (2007).
Proposition 13 CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R¼(M)) ¢¢¢CP(R¼(1)) for every permutation ¼
on f1;:::;Mg and CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness if and only if (i) P(R1)[
19¢¢¢ [ P(RM) is acyclic, and (ii) for all x;y;z 2 X, if (x;y);(y;z) 2 P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [
P(RM), (x;y) 2 P(Ri) and (y;z) = 2 P(Ri) for some i 2 f1;¢¢¢ ;Mg, then (x;z) 2
P(R1) [ ¢¢¢ [ P(RM).
Proof. See Houy (2007, Theorem 5)
From Propositions 11, 12, and 13, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 8 If CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R¼(M)) ¢¢¢CP(R¼(1)) for every permutation ¼
on f1;:::;Mg and CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, then CP(R1;:::;RM) =
CP(R¼(1);:::;R¼(M)) = CP(RM) ¢¢¢CP(R1) = CP(R¼(M)) ¢¢¢CP(R¼(1)) = CP(R1)[¢¢¢[P(RM) =
CP(R1) \ ¢¢¢ \ CP(RM) for every permutation ¼ on f1;:::;Mg
The following example shows that order independence and non-emptiness of pro-
cedure ¯ is strictly more demanding than those of procedure ®. Let X = fx;y;zg,
R1 = f(x;y)g, and R2 = f(y;z)g. Then, P(R1;R2) = P(R2;R1) = f(x;y);(y;z)g,
and hence, CP(R1;R2) = CP(R2;R1). However, CP(R2)CP(R1)(fx;y;zg) = fx;zg whereas
CP(R1)CP(R2)(fx;y;zg) = fxg.
7 Conclusion
Social or individual decision making often involves multiple criteria. Lexicographic
applications of the multiple criteria seem natural and reasonable ways to make de-
cisions in such contexts. However, there are at least two distinct procedures to lexi-
cographically apply two (social or individual) preference relations, as studied in this
paper. Procedure ® constructs the lexicographic composition of multiple binary re-
lations, and then selects its maximal elements while procedure ¯ ﬁrst selects the set
of maximal elements for the ﬁrst binary relation, and then chooses from that set its
maximal elements for the second binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the
Mth binary relation.
There are indeed essential diﬀerences between these two procedures. First, pro-
cedure ®, being a more deliberate way, often ends up with empty choices, whereas
procedure ¯, being simpler and more intuitive, provides ﬁnal choices as long as each
of the two original criteria itself does not have inconsistency. For instance, acyclicity
of the original binary relations is suﬃcient for procedure ¯ to be non-empty, but it is
not so for procedure ®. Precise necessary and suﬃcient conditions for non-emptiness
have been given in Sections 4 and 5 of this paper.
20Second, although procedure ¯ scarcely becomes empty, it may fail a minimum
requirement of choice-consistency, namely contraction consistency, even in the case
where procedure ® satisﬁes non-emptiness and this consistency property. In fact,
procedure ¯ satisﬁes contraction consistency only when it coincides with procedure
®. Exactly when this happens has also been shown in Section 5. However, turning
to path independence, which is stronger than contraction consistency, procedure ¯
satisﬁes non-emptiness and this condition when and only when procedure ® satisﬁes
the same conditions. This requires that the lexicographic composition of multiple
binary relations is quasi-transitive.
Third, the outcomes of procedure ® are non-empty and independent of the order
of applications of the multiple criteria if and only if the union of the original binary
relations is acyclic. This is already a very strong requirement because it implies that
there is no conﬂict between any two criteria. Still, it is not suﬃcient for procedure ¯
to satisfy the same condition. We need an additional condition given in Section 6.
In reality, there are many observations of inconsistent social or individual choices.
Such observations may be explained by the “gap” between procedures ¯ and ®. People
may actually use the simpler approach, namely procedure ¯, which always gives some
answers as long as the original criteria themselves do not contain contradiction, but
which quite easily fails a very basic condition of choice-consistency. In order to
avoid inconsistent choices, they need to take the more deliberate approach, namely
procedure ®. But then, it often fails to provide optimal choices. This is a fundamental
dilemma between non-emptiness and choice-consistency.
We also observe cases of disagreement among individuals who respect the same
list of criteria. They may be explained by diﬀerences in order of application of the
multiple criteria by the individuals.
We hope that the present paper contributes in clarifying the “gap” between the
two procedures of decision making by showing several distinct sets of conditions for
non-emptiness, contraction consistency, path independence, or order independence of
each procedure. It would be interesting to use these conditions to examine how the
choice procedures with multiple criteria can explain social or individual choices in
concrete problems.
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